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Abstract
Cities around the world are developing new ways of governing risks and vulnerabilities. In
the new flood-governance measures, technological risk-prevention is linked to programmes
of social resilience and cultural adaptation. By focusing on the governance of catastrophic
floods in the city of Villahermosa, Mexico, this essay argues that new flood-governance
strategies rely on complicated forms of neoliberal governance, in which flood governance is
turned into a matter of adaptation and self-responsibilisation, while scant attention is paid to
the socio-spatial distribution of vulnerabilities. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in three,
socially differentiated neighbourhoods of Villahermosa in 2011–2014, this study
demonstrates how flood-governance strategies and the residents’ responses to them vary
across the city and how the production of flood risk is connected to the uneven production of
the urban space. The institutional acts of governing aim to render certain groups of
population governable, whilst being unable to eradicate dispersed contestation efforts.




Water-related disasters in the form of hurricanes, tropical storms and floods are causing
overwhelming human suffering and infrastructure damage in the densely populated cities of
the global South. Catastrophic floods, in particular, are a frequent cause of massive
devastation. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014), the
loss of human life and economic assets due to coastal and inland flooding represent two
major climate-related risks in rapidly urbanising emerging economies, including Mexico.1 To
mitigate such risks, government and private initiatives in different parts of the global South
have established intensive programmes of urban flood governance.
The conventional flood-governance strategies have aimed to protect urban
populations from flood disasters through the construction of dams and floodwalls and the
diversion of water through canals and dykes. Recently, there has been a shift from such
technocentric flood-control measures towards integrated flood-resilience strategies that make
people adapt to floods instead of resisting them.2 By focusing on catastrophic floods in the
city of Villahermosa, south-eastern Mexico, this essay argues that the prevalent flood-
governance strategies rely on hybrid forms of neoliberal governance, where technological
1 IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change], ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in C.B. Field et al. (eds.),
Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), pp. 1–32. The terms risk, vulnerability and resilience have contextually varied meanings. In this study,
environmental risks refer to people’s exposure to environmental threats and uncertainties. Vulnerability refers
to people’s inability to withstand adverse effects from multiple stressors, including everyday uncertainties and
catastrophic events. Social resilience refers to people’s capacity to adapt to changing conditions and to recover
from an environmental disaster. See Hans-Martin Füssel, ‘Vulnerability: A Generally Applicable Conceptual
Framework for Climate Change Research’, Global Environmental Change 17: 2 (2007), pp. 155–67.
2 R.M. Ashley, J. Blaskby, R. Newman, B. Gersonius, A. Poole, G. Lindley, S. Smith, S. Ogden and R. Nowell,
‘Learning and Action Alliances to Build Capacity for Flood Resilience’, Journal of Flood Risk Management,
5: 1 (2012), pp. 14–22; Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Marc Caps, Art Dewulf, Erik Mostert, David Tabora and Tharsi
Taillieu, ‘Social Learning and Water Resources Management’, Ecology and Society, 12: 2 (2007).
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risk prevention is linked to programmes that promote social resilience and cultural
adaptation. Hybrid forms of neoliberal governance refer here to a sort of political rationality
and related acts of governing, and modes of creating subjects, where a diversity of
government, private and voluntary sectors, together with an active citizenry, engage in
governance, through diverse techniques and forms of knowledge.3
In contrast to general expectations that the socially oriented flood-governance
strategies will improve the procedural quality of governance programmes and facilitate their
successful implementation 4, this study calls for a more thorough analysis of the role of civic
involvement within the new modes of governance. Without careful consideration of the terms
of participation and the power relations involved, it is difficult to understand how the
‘conduct of conduct’5 involved in neoliberal governance plays out in political practice. Based
on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in three, socially differentiated neighbourhoods of
Villahermosa in 2011–2014, this research focuses on the roles and responsibilities the new
procedures of flood governance assign to different groups of residents and the implications of
these strategies for local agency. This article addresses the following questions: How do
institutional discourses and governing techniques conceive the socio-spatial distribution of
risks and vulnerabilities, and what are the opportunities for citizens to negotiate and contest
such discourses and acts of governing? How are the subject-positions proposed for different
resident groups forged in practice, and how do residents in different city sectors perceive and
3 There is huge variation in the way the term ‘neoliberalism’ is used in contemporary scholarship. As Ferguson,
points out, it is important to make an analytical distinction between usage of neoliberalism as ‘arts of
governing’, in the Foucauldian sense, and neoliberalism as a macroeconomic doctrine and class-based
ideology. James Ferguson ‘The Uses of Neoliberalism’, Antipode, 41: S1 (2010), pp. 166–84. See also, Neil
Brenner, Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, ‘Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways’,
Global Networks, 10: 2 (2010), pp. 182–222; Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in
a Globalizing World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
4 R.M. Ashley et al., ‘Learning and Action Alliances’.
5 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population (London: Palgrave, 2007), p. 193.
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challenge the positions ascribed to them?
Compared to the rich research on inequality and social segregation in Latin
America6, urban environmental governance has received less attention.7 Furthermore, the
studies that do exist concentrate on marginal settlements. This study focuses on three socio-
economically differentiated sectors of Villahermosa: 1) Tabasco 2000, which is a high-
income residential and business-centred area; 2) El Guayabal, which is a middle-income
neighbourhood; and 3) Gaviotas Sur, which is a low-income, informal settlement and an
ambulatory trade area (Figure 1). As the economic centre of Tabasco and a nucleus of the
Mexican oil industry, Villahermosa is inscribed with noticeable socio-spatial differentiation,
a characteristic of many Latin American cities. The following analysis demonstrates how
rationalities and techniques of flood governance are linked with the residents’ differentiated
socio-economic position, uneven exposure to environmental risks and vulnerabilities, and
differentiated opportunities to cope with and recuperate from flood disasters.
PLEASE, PLACE FIGURE 1 HERE
The shifting socio-political terrains of Southern cities provide a highly relevant
arena for analysing the ambiguous procedures of neoliberal governance and their socially
6 Teresa P.R. Caldeira, ‘From Modernism to Neoliberalism in São Paulo: Reconfiguring the City and its
Citizens’. In Andreas Huyssen (ed.), Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 51–77; Ryan Centner, ‘Microcitizenships: Fractious Forms
of Urban Belonging after Argentine Neoliberalism’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,
36: 2 (2012), pp. 336–62; Bryan R. Roberts, ‘Moving On and Moving Back: Rethinking Inequality and
Migration in the Latin American City’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 42: 3 (2010), pp. 587–614.
7 For inspiring analyses on environmental governance in Mexico City, see Adrian Aquilar, ‘Peri-Urbanization,
Illegal Settlements and Environmental Impact in Mexico City’, Cities, 25: 3 (2008), pp. 133–45; Jill Wiggle,
‘The “Graying” of “Green” Zones: Spatial Governance and Irregular Settlement in Xochimilco, Mexico City’,
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38: 2 (2014), pp. 573–89.
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differentiated outcomes.8 As Pelling notes in his study of Guyana, the technology exists to
map environmental risks, build safe houses and design sustainable cities.9 The problem is
rather that prevalent governance structures and power relations often undermine efforts
towards more socially just procedures. This is especially true in many Southern cities, where
large numbers of people live in substandard settlements with high levels of poverty, while
urban elites isolate themselves in gated communities, with exclusive sanitation, health-care
and security services.10 Through an ethnographic analysis of institutional flood-governance
strategies and local tactics of reconfiguration and contestation, the following analysis shows
how the currently dominant forms of flood governance aim to render certain groups of
populations governable, whilst being unable to eradicate dispersed efforts of contestation.
Theoretical approaches: Hybrid governance and inverse governmentality
This study draws upon a theoretical approach of post-Foucauldian governmentality in order
to analyse how the institutional strategies of flood governance are socio-spatially
differentiated across the city and how the production of flood risk is linked to the socially
differentiated production of urban space.11 According to Foucault, all arts of governing carry,
8 Matthew Gandy, ‘Landscapes of Disaster: Water, Modernity, and Urban Fragmentation in Mumbai’,
Environment and Planning A, 40: 1 (2008), pp. 108–30.
9 Mark Pelling, ‘Toward a Political Ecology of Urban Environmental Risk: The Case of Guyana’, in Karl S.
Zimmerer and Thomas J. Bassett (eds.), Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to Geography and
Environment-Development Studies (New York: Guilford, 2003), p. 77.
10 Caldeira, ‘From Modernism to Neoliberalism’; Vanessa Watson, ‘Seen from the South: Refocusing Urban
Planning on the Globe’s Central Urban Issues’, Urban Studies 46: 11 (2009), pp. 2259–75.
11 Post-Foucauldian govenmentality refers here to recent attempts to renew Foucauldian ideas on regulation and
governance to more recent modes of neoliberal governance, as suggested by Fraser, Scales of Justice, pp.
116–30. See also Stephen J. Collier, ‘Topologies of Power: Foucault’s Analysis of Political Government
beyond Governmentality”’, Theory, Culture, Society, 26: 6 (2009), pp. 78–108; Mitchell Dean,
Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 2d ed. (London: Sage, 2010); Nikolas Rose, Pat
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implicitly or explicitly, aspirations to direct human conduct towards certain ends.12 Through
multifaceted power/knowledge relations, governance techniques are selectively implemented,
interpreted and contested within shifting arenas of politics and power. Post-Foucauldian
perspectives on governance offer interesting angles for analysing what authorities of various
sorts want to happen, in pursuit of what objectives, and through what strategies and
techniques they seek to achieve their aims.13 Important insights can be gained into socially
differentiated impacts of neoliberal governance by examining the positions that multifaceted
forms of governance give to different groups of residents living in a socially segregated city,
and how the residents’ social positions shape their opportunities to act in the face of
neoliberal governance.14 Such an approach provides analytical strategies that transcend the
normative assumptions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance, as well as the dichotomous view of
liberating versus repressive techniques of power, characteristic of many policy-oriented
approaches to governance.15
Drawing upon post-Foucauldian ideas of governmentality, Bogaert offers an
inspiring analysis of how the state increases its control over urban territory in Morocco by
implementing authoritarian modes of neoliberal governance that intensively regulate informal
settlements and their populations.16 Equally interesting is Nielsen’s study on local tactics in
O’Malley and Mariana Valverde, ‘Governmentality’, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 2 (2006), pp.
83–103.
12 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, In Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (eds.), The Essential Foucault:
Selections from Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984 (London: New Press, 2003), pp. 229–45.
13 Nikolas Rose, (1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), p. 20.
14 Brenner, Peck and Theodore, ‘Variegated Neoliberalization’, Stephen J. Collier, ‘Neoliberalism as Big
Leviathan, or…? A Response to Wasquant and Hilgers’, Social Anthropology, 20: 2 (2012), pp.186–95.
15 Kim Mckee, ‘Post-Foucauldian Governmentality: What does it Offer Critical Social Policy Analysis?’,
Critical Social Policy, 29: 3 (2009), pp. 465–86.
16 Koenraad Bogaert, ‘The Problem of Slums: Shifting Methods of Neoliberal Urban Government in Morocco’,
Development and Change, 42: 3 (2011), pp. 709–31.
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Mozambique of ‘inverse governmentality’, which focuses on informal residents’ efforts to
mimic the state-defined standards of urban planning and reconfigure the dominant forms of
urban governance.17 Inspired by these analyses, this study approaches flood governance in the
city of Villahermosa as made up of hybrid forms of neoliberal governance, implemented by
diverse actors across governmental, private and civil-society sectors. The study aims to
contribute to the theoretical discussion on neoliberal governance, first, by shedding light on
the complexity of governance in the situations, where legacies of government-led control and
relations of clientelism mix with neoliberal ideas of public-private co-governance and civic
self-responsibilisation, provoking multifaceted struggles over subjectivity in the
implementation of governing.18
Furthermore, this study explores the implementation of neoliberal governance
techniques across three socio-economically differentiated sectors in Villahermosa. These
neighbourhoods differ from each other in terms of the residents’ level of income, access to
property, occupation and infrastructure services. By examining the ambiguous arts of
governing in this socially segregated but dynamically interconnected city, the study seeks to
show how socio-spatial differentiation in people’s exposure to flood risks and vulnerabilities
is produced, negotiated, reconfigured and contested in everyday politics and power.
In addition to control of urban territory, current forms of neoliberal governance
rely on the urban population’s multifaceted conduct.19 Through multiple forms of indirect
regulation, government institutions, private companies and civil-society groups seek to
17 Morten Nielsen, ‘Inverse Governmentality: The Paradoxical Production of Peri-Urban Planning in Maputo,
Mozambique’, Critique of Anthropology, 31: 4 (2011), pp. 329–58.
18 Collier, ‘Topologies of Power’; Valeria Guarneros-Meza, ‘Mexican Urban Governance: How Old and New
Institutions Coexist and Interact’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33: 2 (2009), pp.
463–82.
19 Bob Jessop, ‘From Micro-Powers to Governmentality: Foucault’s Work on Statehood, State Formation,
Statecraft and State Power’, Political Geography, 26: 1 (2007), pp. 34–40.
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‘shepherd’ citizens to internalise emergent forms of flood governance that entail
governmental oversight, public-private partnership and guided civic involvement.20 Central to
these strategies is the attempt to link the educational programmes that aim to increase
people’s social resilience and cultural adaptation to live with water with the technological
procedures of flood control, and, in this way, pursue socio-spatial order. At stake here is not
simply the broadening of neoliberal governance under the guise of local participation, but
also a shift to indirect-control techniques in both the social and spatial domains.21 When
examined through post-Foucauldian notions, measures of technological flood-control and
programmes directed to enhance residents’ social resilience to floods thus emerge as
intimately intertwined projects, whose implicit aim is to facilitate people’s adjustment to
neoliberal ideas of increased self-responsibility. Civic commitment and self-governance
become the key issues in order to reach such goals, while the attention to socio-spatial
distribution of environmental vulnerabilities is set aside.
A post-Foucauldian approach to governance is combined here with recent
theorisations of dispersed identities and mobile networks in order to understand different
residents’ ambiguous negotiations and shifting contestations of prevailing flood-governance
strategies. Recent discussions on dispersed identities and mobile networks have diversified
post-Foucauldian approaches to governance with new theories on cities as conglomerates of
heterogeneous identities and multifaceted intersections.22 Instead of considering different
20 Fraser, Scales of Justice, pp. 125–26; Erik Swyngedouw, ‘Governance Innovation and the Citizen: the Janus
Face of Governance-Beyond-the-State’, Urban Studies, 42: 11 (2005), pp. 1191–2006.
21 For similar arguments concerning urban governance in Europe, see Gisa Weszkalnys, ‘A Robust Square:
Planning, Youth Work, and the Making of Public Space in Post-Unification Berlin’, City & Society, 20: 2
(2008), p. 255.
22 Ananya Roy, ‘Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism’, International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research, 35: 2 (2011), pp. 223–38; AbdouMaliq Simone, ‘2009 Urban Geography Plenary Lecture
on Intersections, Anticipations, and Provisional Publics: Remaking District Life in Jakarta’, Urban
Geography, 31: 3 (2010), pp. 285–308.
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parts of the city as separate spheres, I am interested in how people from different parts of the
city interact with each other and how different neighbourhoods form a mosaic of urban social
geography. Only through such an intersectional analysis, it is possible to understand how the
socially differentiated production of urban space contributes to the people’s uneven exposure
to environmental risks and vulnerabilities. Through an ethnographic inquiry on how different
residents conceptualise the distribution of flood risks and vulnerabilities, and how they see
their opportunities for negotiating and reconfiguring the prevailing forms of governance, the
following study seeks to provide insights into the heterogeneity of contestation efforts in the
everyday making of city-life.
Conceptualising governance as an arena of negotiation, reconfiguration and
contestation offers opportunities to question taken-for-granted assumptions about the
hegemonic power of governing regimes. As Nielsen notes, instead of ‘the city being somehow
read through particular schemes of power, the city constantly reads itself’.23 As government
authorities frequently fail to deliver what they have promised, residents in different parts of the
city reformulate the institutional rules-in-form by improvised rules-in-use. 24  Through
ambiguous inverse tactics and networks, they contest the dominant discourses and acts of
governing, albeit with varying degrees of authority and power. These processes call for detailed
ethnographic analyses of political practices and everyday experiences of governance,
especially in Southern contexts, where a variety of formal ways of engaging in politics mingle
23 Nielsen, ‘Inverse Governmentality’, p. 352. For popular reinterpretations of official environmental and
planning narratives, see Keith Pezzoli, Human Settlements and Planning for Ecological Sustainability: The
Case of Mexico City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew S. Mathews, ‘Unlikely Alliances:
Encounters between State Science, Nature Spirits, and Indigenous Industrial Forestry in Mexico, 1926–2008’,
Current Anthropology, 50: 1 (2009), pp. 75–101.
24 Björn Sletto, ‘Insurgent Planning and Its Interlocutors: Studio Pedagogy as Unsanctioned Practice in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic’, Journal of Planning Education and Research, 33: 2 (2012), pp. 228–40.
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with a diversity of informal ones, creating a situation of legal pluralism.25
Recent studies of environmental and social movements have demonstrated the
sheer variety of contestation struggles in the global South.26 There is a rich literature on
counter-movements in ghettos, favelas, inner cities and other urban margins. However, as
Auyero and Swistun note, many of these studies are of little analytic help when trying to
understand cases where there is no organised movement and no consensus around what the
environmental risks are; instead, people feel confused about the risks and divided over how to
manage them.27 As the following analysis will show, although the residents of Villahermosa
engage in diverse inverse tactics, their dealings with flood risks and vulnerabilities are
embroiled within institutional settings, political power relations and cultural meanings that,
taken together, provoke ambiguous modes of thinking about institutional procedures of
governance and fragmented efforts to contest them.
Villahermosa as a panorama of risk and vulnerability
Villahermosa, the capital of the State of Tabasco, has about one million inhabitants. The oil
boom in the 1980s led to the city’s rapid population growth, as work opportunities offered by
25 Javier Auyero, ‘Visible Fists, Clandestine Kick, and Invisible Elbows: Three Forms of Regulating Neoliberal
Poverty’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 89 (2010), pp. 5–26; Daniel M.
Goldstein, ‘In Our Own Hands: Lynching, Justice and the Law in Bolivia’, American Ethnologist, 30: 1
(2003), pp. 22–43; Anja Nygren, ‘Competing Claims on Disputed Lands: The Complexity of Resource Tenure
in the Nicaraguan Interior’, Latin American Research Review, 39: 1 (2004), pp. 123–53.
26 Asef Bayat and Kees Biekart, ‘Cities of Extremes’, Development and Change, 40: 5 (2009), pp. 815–25;
David V. Carruthers (ed.), Environmental Justice in Latin America: Problems, Promise, and Practice
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); Anja Nygren, (2014) ‘Eco-Imperialism and Environmental Justice’, in
Stewart Lockie, David A. Sonnenfeld and Dina R. Fisher (eds.), Routledge International Handbook of Social
and Environmental Change (Routledge: London, 2014), pp. 58–69.
27 Javier Auyero and Deborah A. Swistun, Flammable: Environmental Suffering in an Argentine Shantytown
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 8–12.
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the oil industry and the service sector brought large numbers of migrants to the region.28
Villahermosa is situated on the tropical wetlands, mainly less than ten metres above the sea
level. Two great rivers –the River Grijalva and the River Carrizal – traverse the city and there
are dozens of lagoons, many of which have been filled for construction purposes. Due to its
location, Villahermosa is exposed to extreme hydro-meteorological events. As 31 per cent of
the Mexican freshwater sources are located in Tabasco, and the region is also one of the main
areas of oil and natural-gas extraction in the country, the challenges faced by the government
authorities in relation to flood governance are extraordinarily high.29
Serious floods have been recorded in Villahermosa since the early 1800s;
however, an exceptionally devastating flood occurred in 2007, and since then the city has
suffered annually from serious flooding. The 2007 flood affected 1.5 million people and the
damages were calculated at US$ 3 billion, equivalent to 30 per cent of the state’s gross
domestic product.30 About 62 per cent of the city was inundated, the water level in several
parts of the city reaching up to four metres above street level.
The 2007 flood was an outcome of a complex interplay of bio-physical and
socio-political processes. On October 2007, a tropical storm provoked extreme rainfall in the
upper watershed of the River Grijalva: from the 28th to the 30th of October, precipitation was
five times higher (996 mm) than the historical average. Water levels in the Peñitas Dam
reservoir reached four metres above the maximum level of operation, at which point the
spillways were opened. There was heavy debate in the regional media and public discussions
that the flood was caused because the electricity companies released the water from the
28 Norma Esther García Meza (1993) Vida urbana y cambio social: El caso de Villahermosa, 1970-1990.
(Villahermosa: Universidad Juárez Autónoma de Tabasco, 1993), p. 2.
29 GET (Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco), ‘Plan estatal de desarrollo 2007–2012’, 2010, p. 14.
30 CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina), ‘Tabasco: Características e impacto socioeconómico de
las inundaciones provocadas a finales de octubre y a comienzos de noviembre de 2007 por el frente frío
número 4’, México, D.F: CEPAL, 2008.
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upper-river reservoir only after the declaration of emergency in order to maximise profits
from electricity generation.31 This delayed action provoked an exceptional increase in
downstream water levels: a volume of water equivalent to 2,055 cubic metres per second
flowed into the River Grijalva through Villahermosa on the following days.  32
Inadequate urban planning and the expansion of settlements into high-risk areas
further accelerated the impacts of the 2007 flood in Villahermosa. When examining this flood
from a historical and socio-spatial perspective, it becomes clear that the natural causes of
flooding cannot be separated from the multi-scale, long-term socio-political processes,
including the rapid urban growth and socially differentiated urban policy. From such a
perspective, the different flood impacts in different parts of the city cannot be understood
without considering the governance structures that produce people’s differential exposure to
vulnerabilities and their socially differentiated living conditions. The wealth of Tabasco 2000
is manifest in gated communities that provide housing for high-ranking business managers,
upper-level oil industry staff and local political elite. Alongside gated residencies in which
commercial activities are prohibited, the area includes distinguished business complexes and
shopping centres, deluxe hotels and restaurants and a private golf club. Parts of Tabasco 2000
have been constructed in a flood-risk area by filling the wetland and constructing massive
flood-protection infrastructure.
El Guayabal is a middle-class neighbourhood, situated near the historic city
centre, with many government offices and medium-size enterprises. Most of the residents are
31 Tabasco Hoy, 8.11.2007, Presente, 26.4.2008, and Tabasco Hoy, 8.10.2008. For more detailed analysis of the
media discourses, see Pia Rinne and Anja Nygren, ‘From Resistance to Resilience: Media Discourses on
Urban Flood Governance in Mexico’, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 17 (2015), pp. 1–23.
32 J. Aparicio, P.F. Martínez-Austria, A. Güiton and A.I. Ramírez, ‘Floods in Tabasco, Mexico: A Diagnosis and
Proposal for Courses of Action’, Journal of Flood Risk Management, 2: 2 (2009), pp. 132–38; María
Perevochtchikova and José Luís Lezama de la Torre, ‘Causas de un desastre: inundaciones del 2007 en
Tabasco, México’, Journal of Latin American Geography, 9: 2 (2010), pp. 73–98.
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middle-income employees, such as schoolteachers, government officials and oil-industry
technicians. Houses in El Guayabal are typically two-storey concrete buildings. Although
temporary floods occur during the rainy season, the magnitude of the 2007 flood was a shock
for El Guayabal residents.
Gaviotas Sur is an informal settlement and an ambulatory trade area located on
the swampland along the River Grijalva. Many of its residents live in corrugated iron huts
along narrow streets or muddy alleyways, some better-off households, with their one- to two-
storey concrete houses, are set apart. Most of the Gaviotas Sur residents subsist on manual
jobs, part-time domestic work and informal trade. The area suffers yearly from flooding, and
during the 2007 flood, the government declared it a catastrophe area.
These divisions within the city are not merely spatial; they also constitute an
organising principle in residents’ everyday life. The inhabitants of Tabasco 2000 have many
opportunities to mitigate the impact of flooding on their lives, while the residents of Gaviotas
Sur live in precarious conditions, with insecure property rights, irregular jobs and scarce
resources to manage the flood risk. Recent policies, which shifted water, sanitation, health-
care and security services from the government to private and third-sector providers, have
accelerated the socio-spatial differentiation. In Tabasco 2000, service provision is largely
privatised; in El Guayabal, people use a mixture of public and private services, while in
Gaviotas Sur, informal services supplement the scant services provided by the municipality.
These issues show how socio-spatial distribution of people’s exposure to flood
risk is linked to the uneven distribution of everyday vulnerabilities. Although the studied
affluent, middle-class and low-class neighbourhoods all share the risk of flooding, the
informal residents’ precarious housing conditions and limited access to services intensify the
14
impact of floods on them.33 The dominant forms of urban policy and planning have tended to
protect the environmental quality of affluent neighbourhoods, while diverting hazardous
industries and waste-sites towards informal settlements.
In 2011–2014, I carried out 50 open-ended, face-to-face ethnographic
interviews in the neighbourhoods of Tabasco 2000, El Guayabal and Gaviotas Sur in order to
gain an understanding of different residents’ views of flood governance. For detailed
understanding of people’s experiences of flooding and perceptions of everyday politics,
informal conversations and participant observation were crucial. In 2011–2012, our research
team conducted a questionnaire at the same sites. Administered to 300 households, the
questionnaire inquired about living conditions, infrastructure services and people’s exposure
to environmental risks and vulnerabilities.
Studies on risks and vulnerabilities have rarely included elite groups, partly
because it is difficult to gain access to privileged people and privileged places. This became
clear to me when carrying out fieldwork in the gated communities of Tabasco 2000. I had to
make several adjustments in my methods in order to gain access and to win the residents’
confidence. Participant observation became crucial for data gathering, especially in Tabasco
2000 because many of these residents were suspicious of the purpose of my research and
cautious if I made notes during the interviewing. As high-ranking businesspeople and
politicians, they were careful of protecting their privacy. It seemed evident that some of them
tried to use me – in their calculation, a well-connected Northern researcher – as a channel to
get access to socially influential networks.
Furthermore, I conducted 55 interviews with federal, state and municipal-level
government authorities, private flood consultants and members of non-governmental
33 Martin J. Murray, ‘Fire and Ice: Unnatural Disasters and the Disposable Urban Poor in Post-Apartheid
Johannesburg’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33: 1 (2009), p. 167.
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organisations (NGOs). This data was complemented by an analysis of flood-policy reports,
urban-development plans and documents of territorial ordering. Archival research and
analysis of regional newspapers helped to contextualise the shifting discourses on flood
governance that emerged during the ethnographic inquiry.
Ethnographic research is particularly promising for detailed analysis of
theoretical arguments about power relations, social networks and cultural meanings related to
discourses and practices of governance. Interpretative ethnography, with its interest in
alternative conceptualisations, offers a critical vantage point from which to challenge
generalising comments on governance and inequality.34 People’s experiences of risks and
vulnerabilities, and their networks of everyday politics are difficult to grasp through macro-
scale surveys only. The following ethnographic analysis seeks to illustrate the socially
differentiated character of flood governance and the ambiguous ways that people forge, cope
and contest the dominant forms of environmental governance. It also shows how flood risks
are subjected to multiple layers of judgement and interpretation, depending upon who is
trying to make sense of risks and for what purposes.35
Multifaceted agendas of control and self-regulation
Discourses on cultural adaptation and civic involvement
In 2003, the government-led flood-control project, Proyecto Integral Contra Inundaciones
(PICI) was established in Tabasco, to provide environmental safety in Villahermosa through
34 Alain Cerwonka and Liisa H. Malkki, Improvising Theory: Process and Temporality in Ethnographic
Fieldwork (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 14.
35 Murray, ‘Fire and Ice’, pp. 167–68.
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construction of flood-preventive infrastructure, such as dams, canals and floodwalls. The
2007 flood gave the impetus to transform such technological flood-control measures into
integrated flood-resilience strategies, with a revised flood-governance programme, Programa
Hidrico Integral de Tabasco (PHIT), established in 2008. 36 This new programme holds the
crucial idea that infrastructure projects alone cannot combat flood disasters; rather,
technological flood control needs to be linked to cultural adaptation and social resilience.
This raises important questions related to post-Foucauldian notions of governmentality: how
does power operate within the new modes of governance, and what techniques of governing
are used? Especially interesting is the question of how local residents are constituted as
subjects. In 2011, this question began to preoccupy my inquiry after I interviewed a high-
ranking official at the Instituto de Protección Civil (Institute of Civil Protection, IPC), who
explained the new flood-governance strategies in a way that inverted my preliminary
assumptions:
No disaster is natural; rather, disasters are socially constructed… People must become
aware of the threats and know how to manage them. Campaigns of education and
capacity-building are needed to promote a culture of self-protection. So that people
understand that nobody is going to protect you from a flood but that you need to protect
yourself. All environmental problems are socially constructed, I mean, a matter of
culture. Unfortunately, many people think that if I have a problem, the government has
to resolve it. People do not take up the baton.
(IPC, 21 February 2011)
Similar opinions became clear in many interviews with government officials, urban planners
and private flood consultants. According to these authorities and experts, flood governance
36 CONAGUA (Comisión Nacional del Agua) (2012) ‘Plan hídrico integral de Tabasco’. Available at
www.cna.gob.mx/Contenido.aspx?n1=4&n2=103&n3=194 (accessed 5 May 2012).
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could no longer be reduced to a technical problem; rather flood risk is, according to them, a
socio-cultural phenomenon. It was especially the civil engineers responsible for flood
management who emphasised to me that technological flood control is not sufficient for
preventing devastating floods; they considered social capacity-building and civic self-
responsibilisation key for successful governance.
This ‘social turn’ in flood governance placed considerable emphasis on cultural
adaptation to risk. Interestingly, government authorities and flood consultants understood the
socially constructed character of risks as indicating that different people have different
cultural capabilities for adapting to floods. Slum-dwellers were regarded as indifferent to
build a safe living environment because they were considered to lack a thorough
understanding of the risks. After the 2007 flood, the Governor of Tabasco appeared in the
media exhorting ‘people to calm down and stop spreading false rumours’.37 Such
rumorología was especially considered characteristic of the poor, who officials saw as
reluctant to adapt to living with water. In this way, vulnerability was linked to cultural
attitudes of indifference, with scant attention given to the socio-economic conditions that
make some people more vulnerable than others. Simultaneously, this turn to social resilience,
with a strong emphasis on the cultural awareness of the risk, delegitimized the extensive
government interventions on flood-risk prevention.
While flood governance in earlier decades focused on controlling the urban
territory through massive infrastructure projects, current flood governance is oriented towards
governing urban populations. These procedures are implemented not only through legislation
and public regulation, but increasingly through public-private co-governance and market-
based incentives, including privatisation of water, sanitation and waste-management services.
In order to diminish the costs of public spending, the government outsources various flood-
37 Tabasco Hoy, 02.11.2007.
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management tasks and service provisions to private (sub)contractors and civil-society groups.
These measures challenge the view of the state as the sole service provider, whilst replacing
the notion of public services with that of private provisions.
Different from earlier, government-led flood-control policies, current
mechanisms of flood governance give civic self-responsibilisation a key role. As several
officials explained to me, whereas in the 2000s, environmental-policy guidelines were drafted
as rigorous rules to be obeyed, currently, the government prioritises civic involvement and
self-responsibilisation.38 As the Development Plan of Tabasco (PEOT) emphasises, the
government’s role is to facilitate citizens to develop their own initiatives to care for their
living conditions and mitigate their own vulnerability.39
In order to efficiently incorporate local residents in flood governance,
government authorities have contracted private consultants and NGO facilitators with expertise
in participatory methods to promote social-oriented flood-governance programmes.
Correspondingly, many authorities have stressed the incorporation of local political leaders,
so-called caciques, and their assistants, called achichincles, into flood governance, based on
the argument that local leaders know how to prevent confrontation. The caciques and
achichincles, as mediators between the officials and residents, were assumed to have an
intimate knowledge of everyday politics and the charisma to speak in a socially resonant way.
These skills were considered crucial when promoting self-responsibility, as a government
coordinator of participatory programmes noted:
It’s important to incorporate local leaders in our actions because the leaders know how to
manage people. We want to prevent flood risk from turning into political problems, and
38 Author’s interviews 15 Feb. 2011 and 21 Feb. 2011; group discussion 17 Oct. 2011.
39 PEOT, ‘Programa Estatal de Ordenamiento Territorial y Desarrollo Urbano del Estado de Tabasco 2007–
2012’. Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco, 2008.
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so we encourage civic participation. It’s a way to control social mobilisation.
(Coordinator of civic participation, 19 October 2011)
What was interesting in these comments was the issue that both the government authorities and
the development facilitators considered the participatory programmes as apolitical, while also
identifying them as a way to confront local resistance. Similarly, they claimed that flood risks
are socially constructed, but unconnected to the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities. Through
calculating comments, authorities simultaneously constructed civic participation as apolitical
and as a politically efficient way to control social mobilisation.
In line with neoliberal thinking, the authorities responsible for flood governance
emphasised that it is important that people readopt the traditional way of ‘living with water’
(convivir con el agua) and the time-honoured ‘culture of water’ (cultura del agua). They
explained how people in Tabasco traditionally moved in kayaks and constructed two-storey
houses, where the upper storey served as storage (tapanca) for stocking supplies for when the
water level rose. In the new flood-governance proposals, local knowledge is presented as a
valuable asset to promote a ‘culture of water resilience’. As an official of the Secretaría de
Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources,
SEMARNAT) explained:
We cannot conquer Nature; rather, we need strategies of adaptation and self-regulation.
We now have integrated schemes of governance, where we involve actors from different
levels of government, from the private sector and NGOs to work with local residents.
Earlier, people adjusted to the reality that this is a zone of water. When the flood was
over, they returned to their homes, cleaned their houses and continued to live normally.
Now in any flooding, people feel damaged. It’s important to learn to live with water
again.
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(SEMARNAT, 15 February 2011)
Such agendas increasingly shift the responsibility of flood management to local residents. By
presenting the participatory forms of flood governance as a mean to return to traditional
forms of collective action, officials constructed the past as a model for civic responsibility
and cultural adaptation. They had little consideration of the unequal access to resources and
the uneven distribution of vulnerabilities. This study’s interview and survey data indicate that
there were great differences in: who lived in neighbourhoods prone to flooding; who were
evacuated by which means and where; how the damaged neighbourhoods were rebuilt; and
who was represented in the decision making concerning the reconstruction.40
Techniques of governance: Indirect conduct of conduct
The new flood-governance strategies have generated different techniques of governing in the
different socio-economic sectors across the city. In affluent neighbourhoods, government
institutes and private companies are building canals and floodwalls and installing modern
pumping stations that can quickly remove floodwater. Meanwhile, people in informal
settlements are asked to pile up sandbags, although everybody knows that in a catastrophic
flood, this is a cosmetic effort. The government also carries out intensive awareness-raising
programmes, based on the view that a key cause of flooding in informal settlements is a lack
of a culture of order, which makes people drop litter and thus choke the drains. The implicit
idea is that the informal residents need to become aware that they themselves are responsible
40 For similar issues raised concerning the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, see Robert D.
Bullard and Beverly Wright (eds.), Race, Place, and Environmental Justice After the Hurricane Katrina:
Struggles to Reclaim, Rebuild, and Revitalize New Orleans and the Gulf Coast (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2009).
21
for heightened flood risk and should transform themselves from nonchalant slum-dwellers
into responsible citizens.
Authorities have paid scant attention to how the uneven provision of services
distinguishes neighbourhoods in terms of vulnerability, and how multi-scale urban policy
sustains differentiated citizenship, where public services become privileges, granted
according to people’s socio-economic status.41 The lack of political will to apply risk-
prevention strategies in shantytowns, which government officials consider as places of social
ill and environmental hazard, creates a vicious cycle of increased risk and vulnerability. By
emphasising the cultural causes of flood disasters, the government authorities and flood
consultants ignore the multi-scalar causes of socially differentiated disaster vulnerability,
including the socio-economic marginality of the poor, who have no other option than to seek
shelter in flood-prone environments.42
This status of living in risk-prone environments, at the legal margin, sustains the
everyday vulnerability of Gaviotas Sur residents. Many households do not have access to
clean water, and sanitation and health-care services are limited, with authorities claiming that
it is not their responsibility to provide services to illegal settlements. The institutional
imagery of informal settlements, as having a culture of the outskirts and an economy of
begging and peddling, constructs these areas as spaces to be governed separately from the
rest of the city, thereby concealing the multifaceted ways that affluent neighbourhoods,
middle-class communities and informal settlements are interlinked in terms of labour
relations and provision of (informal) services.
41 On differentiated citizenship and its contestations, see James Holston, ‘Contesting Privilege with Right: The
Transformation of Differentiated Citizenship in Brazil’, Citizenship Studies, 15: 3–4 (2011), pp. 335–52; Lucy
Earle, ‘From Insurgent to Transgressive Citizenship: Housing, Social Movements and the Politics of Rights in
Sao Paulo’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 44: 1 (2012), pp. 97–126.
42 Murray, ‘Fire and Ice’, p. 185.
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In line with the new flood-governance techniques, Villahermosa has recently
become an arena of huge projects of zoning and coding. The aim of these projects, using new
techniques of remote sensing and risk assessment, is to identify the critical risk zones and the
populations living in them. As indicated in Figure 1, most of these areas are located along the
riverbanks, and occupied by the poor. The government is investing heavily in regulating the
circulation of water and people in these areas. There are projects for preventing clandestine
house-building, enhancing residents’ environmental awareness and relocating street vendors
to registered markets with modern standards of waste management. The streets of Gaviotas
Sur have been given official names and the plots in its alleyways have been numbered, to
track exactly who is living in the critical risk-zones.
In my interviews, government authorities and flood consultants emphasised
residents’ own behaviour as an important factor in why floods have different effects in
different neighbourhoods. They pointed out that the residents of Gaviotas Sur themselves
chose to settle in a hazard-prone area and were thus responsible for the drastic consequences
of flooding. There was little acknowledgement that survival obliged many of these people to
occupy the former wasteland. In my interviews with Gaviotas Sur residents, many of them
pointed out that, in fact, the local political leaders had persuaded them to settle there in order
to get their votes. The authorities of the Comisión Nacional del Agua (National Water
Commission, CONAGUA) claimed that the poor people’s habit of building shacks in high-
risk areas was based on a ‘culture of damage-beneficiaries’, which enticed people into
settling in flood-prone areas and subsequently demanding compensations.43 The common
term for informal residents, ‘paracaidistas’ (‘parachutists’), describes those who materialise
out of thin air and invade unoccupied areas in order to extort compensation. This term
delegitimises the informal residents’ views that it is the responsibility of the government to
43 Author’s interview, 15 Feb. 2011.
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facilitate safe living conditions for all citizens, regardless of their socio-economic position.
Current flood-governance strategies strive for relocating informal residents
living in high flood-risk areas. Since 2009, the government has relocated thousands from the
city centre to the suburban periphery. People’s reluctance to leave has been interpreted as a
sign of indifference, as an official of CONAGUA expressed in El Heraldo on 5 May 2011:
‘it’s a pity that these citizens don’t understand that the removal is for their own security, as
these areas are not apt for residence, and thus don’t have any services’. According to archival
data, plans to relocate these people have existed since the 1990s; however, political
sensitivity caused officials to postpone these efforts. The 2007 flood provided a pretext to
‘clean’ the city centre of informal residents in the name of saving the city from a future
disaster. The settlers’ houses were bulldozed to create ‘an urban territory with order and
equilibrium’, as the Development Plan of Tabasco states.44 This is a clear example of social
segregation between those who can afford to live in the newly designed areas and those
pushed to the margins.
An illustration of how the production of flood risk is linked to socially
differentiated production of urban space is that affluent neighbourhoods and commercial
installations have also been built in areas where construction is prohibited. Civil servants are
granting clandestine construction permits for powerful concessionaires and affluent citizens,
while categorising poor people’s informal land occupations as illegal. This demonstrates how
the rules of flood governance are negotiated in clientelist networks, where authorities have
the power to define how rights and responsibilities apply.45 Common across the public,
private and voluntary sectors, these clientelist networks are informal and thus largely beyond
44 GET, ‘Evaluación y actualización: Plan estatal de desarrollo 2007–2012’. Gobierno del Estado de Tabasco,
2010, p. 156.
45 For an interesting analysis of the political reconfiguration of urban risks in Colombia, see Austin Zeiderman,
‘On Shaky Ground: The Making of Risk in Bogotá’, Environment and Planning A, 44: 7 (2012), pp. 1570–88.
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public scrutiny.
Despite the official arguments that flood governance is everyone’s
responsibility, the reality is that civil society is fragile and local elites dominate decision-
making. Government authorities control social protest by arguing that co-governance requires
cooperation instead of scandalisation. By promoting outsourcing and public-private co-
governance that diffuse questions of responsibility, authorities seek to depoliticise the flood
issue. The social-justice and human-rights advocates, when their voices are heard, try to re-
politicise the matter by claiming that flood governance cannot be outsourced to private or
civil-society actors, but that it is the government’s responsibility to address public concerns
related to flooding.46
Current flood-governance techniques also aim to transform environmental
uncertainties into manageable risks. The officials of the Instituto de Protección Civil (IPC)
frequently reminded me that ‘it’s important to give the view that flood risk is under
institutional control’.47 However, due to heightened doubts about the possibility to
technologically control the risk, the flood consultants and government authorities emphasised
that flood governance needs to be conducted primarily from a socio-cultural point of view.
The authorities noted that ‘if people don’t respect water, it will take revenge and recover what
is its own’, which makes it obligatory to develop strategies for ‘allying with water’.48 In their
view, the knowledge that flood-management specialists gain through techniques of remote
sensing and risk scenarios should be integrated with the knowledge of development
46 Author’s interviews, 17 Oct. 2011 and 19 Oct. 2011. See also Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos-
Tabasco (2011). Available at
www.cndh.org.mx/sites/all/fuentes/documentos/Recomendaciones/2011/REC_2011_061.pdf (accessed 7 May
2012).
47 Author’s interviews, 21 Feb. 2011 and 19 Oct. 2011.
48 Author’s interviews, 16 Feb. 2011 and 21 Oct. 2011. See also flood specialists’ and government officials’
interviews in the regional newspaper of Presente, 26.4.2008 and 10.4.2010.
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facilitators and local leaders who know how to ‘manage’ people. Through the integration of
such knowledge, it would be possible, so they claimed, to develop detailed plans for city
order and social resilience. This knowledge, which authorities claimed was to serve the
common good in terms of risk management, contained highly politicised guidelines for
rendering particular population groups governable. Special procedures were planned for
correcting the behaviour of those considered ‘risk-causers’.
Simultaneously, various forms of private regulation have been encouraged, with
the intention to spur technological innovation and green economy that facilitate cost-effective
flood management. In such strategies, public regulation and legally binding contracts are
mixed with privatisation of water and sanitation services, and voluntary programmes of civic
protection and community well-being. These procedures generate governance arenas, in
which private companies and civil-society groups are authorised to conduct some of the
governmental tasks.49 On many occasions, the government deliberately promoted public-
private partnerships in order to legitimise interventions that would otherwise have met with
considerable resistance. In this hybridity of governance, citizens have difficulties in knowing
whom to claim responsible for what.
At the same time, concentrating decision-making in government institutes
undermines the concept of governance as horizontal networks. The result is a multi-layered
assemblage of governing, where diverse regulatory schemes, administrative measures and
moral propositions are mingled with a logic that favours indirect institutional governance,
market-based regulation and attribution of individual responsibility. Such neoliberal forms of
governance aim to create citizens, who transform themselves from a state of inaction to
taking on responsibilities.50
49 Ferguson, ‘The Uses of Neoliberalism’; Swyngedouw, ‘Governance Innovation’.
50 Rose, O’Malley and Valverde, ‘Governmentality’.
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A careful examination of political practices of governance helps to understand
who governs what and whom, with what techniques and towards what ends.51 What still
remains to be explained is how local residents’ understandings resonate with or contest the
measures by which the authorities and flood-management experts aim to create governable
places and governable subjects. To complement Foucauldian approaches to governmentality,
which, according to some critics, focus on the efforts of planners and programmers to govern
marginalised people52, the next section explores how residents in different parts of the city
understood themselves within the regimes designed to govern their subjectivities. It also
looks at how residents renegotiated and contested the prevalent arts of governing.
Everyday contingencies and contestations
Dispersed identities and multifaceted inverse tactics
The government authorities’ and flood consultants’ goals to create segregated zones of
‘sustainable living’ in Villahermosa clashed with the messiness of everyday life. Residents
from different parts of the city challenged the disciplinary forms of neoliberal governance
through tactics of inverse governmentality.53 In Gaviotas Sur, residents regularised their land
occupations through intermittent house-renovation projects. They filled their plots with sand
and waste to demonstrate to the authorities that they are living within the flood-risk limits.
They renovated their simple huts with concrete and corrugated iron to show that their homes
are built with durable materials and thus according to standards required by the rules for
51 Dean, Governmentality, pp. 30–37.
52 Mckee, ‘Post-Foucauldian Governmentality’, p. 479.
53 Nielsen, ‘Inverse Governmentality’, p. 331.
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mitigating flood impacts. They also constructed small sidewalks (banquetas) in front of their
houses and mounted rustic street lamps in the shadowy alleys to demonstrate that their homes
were tidy and permanently occupied. They even reinterpreted the meaning of the street names
established by city registers. Street of Engineers’ and ‘Street of Anthropologists’ were a
source of pride because, according to residents, ‘it all sounds more official now’.54
It was through such inverse tactics that the informal residents sought to
challenge the authorities’ efforts to legitimise the uneven production of urban space through
arguments of different people’s different abilities to prevent the flood risk. Such inverse
tactics were a way to show improvements in the neighbourhood’s environmental safety and
thus decrease the likelihood of being forcibly removed. In the informal residents’ view, they
had a right to urban space because they built their homes and everyday lives there, and
recovered from its terrible floods and turbulent politics. The residents of Gaviotas Sur
questioned institutional strategies, according to which informal settlements had to be
governed separately in order for flood prevention to be efficient. In their view, such
procedures concealed the hierarchical structures of flood governance and increased social
segregation.
When visiting informal settlements, government officials judged the residents’
housing improvements as cleverly calculated tactics. At the same time, they felt obliged to
somehow acknowledge these informal acts of regulation because, in everyday politics, house
improvements provide social justification for land occupation. Thus, these inverse tactics
were not just minor acts of everyday resistance. Inhabitants who have been able to occupy
formerly idle land and make significant house improvements have the possibility to later gain
official recognition of their residence.
Correspondingly, residents of affluent and middle-class neighbourhoods used
54 Author’s interview, 12 Aug. 2011.
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several inverse tactics to appropriate urban space by acts that demonstrated their fulfilment of
building a safe living environment. The middle-class residents of El Guayabal gradually
amplified their single-storey houses to two- or three-storey buildings with balconies,
justifying their unauthorised actions through the argument that the upper stories served for
auxiliary accommodation and storage during the flood contingency. These renovations
increased the property values in the neighbourhood, and justified the residents’ requests for
improved services.
In the affluent neighbourhoods of Tabasco 2000, several families extended their
backyard by constructing an outdoor grill or a car shelter on adjacent federal land. They
justified these actions on the grounds that as they embanked and paved the seized piece of
yard, this improved the control of water flow from the muddy brook running on the federal
land and thus enhanced the environmental safety in the neighbourhood. Residents also
appropriated some public streets and green-spaces for access routes and leisure facilities
exclusively for the gated communities on the grounds that as they could afford private waste-
management services in such areas, this increased the neighbourhood’s safety from floods.
Through such arguments, the residents of Tabasco 2000 supported the concept of
differentiated citizenship, which justified their environmental privileges on the basis of their
distinguished social status. Proud of what they had achieved through personal
accomplishment, the residents of affluent neighbourhoods argued that since they pay huge
taxes and contribute significantly to the national economy, they deserve more efficient
protection from floods than the economically inefficient slum-dwellers. Julio, an
economically successful and socially influential businessman conceptualised the issue as
follows:
The officials have to serve us better because we are those who raise the city, who pay a
large amount of taxes. People here in Tabasco 2000 do not feel the floods in the same
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way as those in Gaviotas Sur. It’s because of cultural difference. Here, we don’t throw
waste into the streets because it provokes flooding…In Gaviotas Sur, people don’t care.
The government cannot protect them because they just settle wherever. They don’t have
sewers, or potable water. And they don’t pay taxes.
(Julio, 11 October 2011)
Justifying their own positions, the affluent and middle-class residents demanded that
authorities provide their neighbourhoods with efficient water storage systems and backup
generators to eliminate unnecessary disturbances in their daily lives.55 Simultaneously, they
stressed that the poor needed to stop to asking for governmental help for everything because
being a successful citizen requires self-achievement. Many of them supported the authorities’
efforts to remove informal residents from the city centre, based on the argument that slum-
dwellers and ambulatory traders ‘don’t obey the laws’ and are a ‘source of environmental and
social disorder’.56
The residents of Gaviotas Sur contested the affluent and middle-class residents’
views of their privileged positions by emphasising everyone’s right to a safe living
environment. They questioned the privatisation of public services, claiming that the
government has a responsibility to provide basic amenities and disaster prevention, for every
neighbourhood. At the same time, these informal residents struggled for official recognition
of their alternative ways of living, which included many aspects that the authorities
categorised as illicit. In the precarious settlements, where the basic infrastructure was rarely
the result of public policy, people enacted diverse tactics to cope with deficiency.57 They
55 Author’s interview, 8 Aug. 2011.
56 Author’s interviews, 11 Aug. 2011, 17 Aug. 2011 and 19 Oct. 2011.
57 For an inspiring analysis how ideas of trash and waste change over time and context, and how radical art may
alter our imagination of the slums, see Gareth A. Jones, ‘Slumming About: Aesthetics, Art and Politics’, City,
15:6 (2011), pp. 696–708. For corresponding ideas concerning urban planning, see Faranak Miraftab,
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connected their informal water pipes and electricity wires to the official networks. And, in the
absence of public security services and early flood-warning systems, they practiced informal
security control by being vigilant and informing each other of any sign of increasing water
levels in the rivers that might indicate a forthcoming flood.
The examination of different residents’ conceptions of risk and vulnerability –
not just as portrayed in risk cartographies, but as lived experience – revealed a complex social
geography, where people navigated the city according to their evaluation of places as
worthwhile versus risky. On rare occasions when affluent residents visited informal
settlements, they felt highly insecure. In their view, slums were overwhelming places,
requiring extreme attention; they were underdeveloped and overused sites, where the ‘streets
and alleyways split like a broken plate’ and whose ‘inefficiency provoked environmental
hazard and social disorder for the entire city’.58 The affluent residents were horrified of the
risks that people living in deprived shacks along the riverbanks were ready to take;
meanwhile, the residents living in these areas emphasised their intimate knowledge of the
river and how their lives were not simply miserable but also worth living. As Josefina from
Gaviotas Sur, explained to me: ‘Even though my neighbourhood may be ugly, for me it’s
pretty.’59
The middle-class residents, living near the city centre demonstrated strong
attachments to their neighbourhood. When I showed them archival photographs of old
Villahermosa, they began enthusiastically to tell me stories, recalling which stores had
operated on which streets and up to what level floodwaters had risen on different occasions.
While the affluent residents of Tabasco 2000 preferred private green-spaces where they could
‘Insurgent Planning: Situating Radical Planning in the Global South’, Planning Theory, 8: 1 (2009), pp. 32–
50.
58 Author’s interview, 11 Feb. 2011.
59 Author’s interview, 12 Aug. 2011.
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organise private cocktail parties, middle-class residents valued the open-air events arranged
in the centre, where anyone could go and dance in the streets. The residents of Gaviotas Sur
loved the bustling streets where the animated activities promoted a feeling of a lived-in place.
For them, the few green-spaces in their neighbourhood were a source of fear because they
were places where one might be at risk of a sudden flood or an assault. For security reasons,
parents preferred their children to play in a busy street rather than an isolated park.
While the government authorities tried to convince people that environmental
risks are manageable, for local residents of any socio-economic status, flood risks were
uncertainties surrounded with much confusion as to their causes. Every year during the
heavy-rain season, concerns of flooding heightened across the city. Such perceptions were
difficult to transform through official campaigns of good governance, especially because
people were highly sensitive to any rumours concerning corruption or horse-trading in flood
governance.60
Nevertheless, environmental risks and vulnerabilities affected different
residents in different ways. The government officials and consultants who emphasised self-
responsibility in disaster recovery ignored the fact that normalising one’s life after a
catastrophe has much to do with people’s socio-economic situation, and thus is not simply a
question of individual resolve.61 According to our questionnaire, 30 per cent of the
households of Tabasco 2000 and 15 per cent of those of El Guayabal had home insurance62,
while none of the informal residents of Gaviotas Sur were even eligible. Following floods,
60 There was lively discussion on corrupt practices in flood governance in the Tabascan media. The newspapers
had a wide coverage of corrupt practices associated with flood governance, stating that much of the work
carried out in the name of flood prevention has lined the pockets of corrupt government officials and greedy
construction companies (Tabasco Hoy, 8.10.2008; Tabasco Hoy, 19.6.2010; Presente, 29.9.2010).
61 Gordon Walker, ‘Beyond Distribution and Proximity: Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of Environmental
Justice’, Antipode, 41: 4 (2009), pp. 614–36.
62 These rates are relatively high, considering that home insurance is not common in Mexico.
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about 88 per cent of Gaviotas Sur residents spent weeks or months in emergency shelters or
lodged with relatives until they were able to return to their homes or find another place to
live. None of the Tabasco 2000 residents even thought about leaving for an emergency
shelter. Many of them left for a hotel or a second house elsewhere in Mexico, as José Manuel
stated with a sign of relief: ‘Thanks to God, I have another house in Cancun, where I stayed
during the flood’.63 Hence, the ability to recover after the disaster was linked to socio-
economic status; further, differences stemming from age and gender were also significant.
Women responsible for domestic well-being often suffered the most traumas. Tania, a mother
of two from Gaviotas Sur, who worked as a chambermaid in Tabasco 2000, explained her
sense of fragility as follows:
Water rushed in like a snake attacking. There was no time to save anything. There were
mattresses, fridges, tables, wardrobes swimming in the river. They [the officials] began
to order ‘Go away, go away!’ It’s easy to give an order like that; but how are you going
to make it if you have to leave your home.
(Tania, 15 February 2011)
City-life was also difficult to regulate through institutional governance strategies because
people created a fluctuating urban fabric through mobile networks, deferring fixed territories
of belonging.64 The low-income residents of Gaviotas Sur were linked to upper- and middle-
class neighbourhoods through temporary jobs as watchmen and domestic servants and
through informal services of blacksmithing, carpentry, tire patching and alternative medicine.
63 Author’s interview, 11 Aug. 2011.
64 Similar notes have been made of the everyday life in various Southern cities. For Lagos, see Matthew Gandy,
‘Planning, Anti-Planning and the Infrastructure Crisis Facing Metropolitan Lagos’, Urban Studies, 43: 2
(2006), pp. 271–96; for Dakar, Johannesburg and Jakarta, see AbdouMaliq Simone, City Life from Jakarta to
Dakar: Movements at the Crossroads (New York: Routledge, 2010).
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Correspondingly, the residents of Tabasco 2000 organised charity activities on behalf of the
poor trying to recover from flood contingencies.
In this bustle of class intersections, informal residents made note of the
institutional structures that provided affluent residents with privileges in the shape of
infrastructure and flood-risk prevention. At the same time, lack of these infrastructures
constrained the poor’s opportunities for living with dignity amidst the reduced social policies
due to neoliberal reforms. Even when the poor were aware of the uneven consequences of the
socially differentiated flood governance, they often replicated such an approach in practice.
In many interviews, the residents of Gaviotas Sur reiterated the Governor’s message that the
2007 flood reached such a magnitude because they did not obey the authorities’ instructions
but spread false rumours. As Adriana explained me ashamed:
We lost much during the flood because we didn’t pay attention. The Governor announced:
‘Go away, because there will be a flood!’ But people said: ‘How can the Governor know if
he is nothing like God?’ It was our fault for not obeying the instructions.
 (Adriana, 12 August 2011)
Regardless of their social position, many people claimed that the government had abandoned
them, yet at the same time, they criticised strict governmental control. For many residents, the
new surveillance techniques, based on risk scenarios and mapping of high-risk areas, were
paving the way for flood governance that ignored local needs. The multiplicity of actors
involved in governance increased a sense of suspicion, making people pose questions about
who benefits from flood-governance programmes and who bears the costs.
Nevertheless, there were considerable differences in the ways that residents saw
their position in the decision-making. Many residents of Tabasco 2000 were members of
local chambers of commerce or other professional associations, with close links to politicians.
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They had clear visions for how to improve risk prevention in their own neighbourhood, and
less interest in integrated urban planning.65 They stressed the quality of their neighbourhood’s
environmental services and rapid risk mitigation. The residents of Gaviotas Sur made fretful
comments about how the canals that diverted floodwater away from affluent neighbourhoods
transferred the risk to poor communities.66 The middle-class residents of El Guayabal asked
the government for flood-governance strategies that would effectively improve their daily
lives instead of superficial renovation of historic buildings. Santiago from El Guayabal
conceptualised the situation as follows:
In the restoration projects, they are just painting facades. This isn’t what is most needed.
Here, a good system of sewers would be needed to manage the grey-water. During the
2007 flood, the dirty water entered into our houses…But, nobody cares about sewers
because such things are invisible. The politicians prefer to paint buildings for the
political publicity.
(Santiago, 22 August 2011)
Interestingly, while the government attempted to diminish public-spending costs through
outsourcing and voluntary agreements, local residents saw the government’s active
involvement in flood governance and urban planning as a sign of legitimacy. It was part of
their view of how to get things done, albeit slowly and often in an authoritative way. The
residents of Gaviotas Sur also lacked the technological flood-control projects, especially
noting that floodwalls and water-pumping stations were being installed in affluent parts of the
65 For similar notions concerning the cities of Querétaro and San Luis Potosí in Mexico, see Guarneros-Meza,
‘Mexican Urban Governance’, pp. 474–75.
66 There was lively discussion on this issue in the Tabascan newspapers in 2011. Social-justice activists claimed
that the attempts to control the flow of floodwater through canals, saves some people at the expense of
sacrificing others. See e.g. Tabasco Hoy, 16.11.2011.
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city. Contrary to the authorities and private consultants, who wanted people to become more
self-governed, the residents themselves expected the government to take care of their
environmental safety and well-being. At the same time, they contested the governmental
efforts of oversight and paternalist control, as the following section shows.
Networks of sporadic resistance
Institutional governance strategies do not deterministically define people’s subject-position
nor do they determine their behaviour; rather, in everyday life, acts of governing are
reformulated through ‘quiet encroachments of the ordinary’ that occur outside, in spite of and
in articulation with, formal governance strategies.  67 This makes it difficult to claim that one
strategy falls within the order of ‘oppression’ and another one in tactics of ‘liberation’.68 By
trying to avoid dichotomies between imposed interventions and insurgent inventions, this
study conceptualises local contestations as social formations that are dispersed and
fragmented, always in-the-making.69 This is especially so in Villahermosa, where claims to
environmental justice are rarely articulated within a frame of organised protest movement.
Many studies of environmental and social-justice struggles focus on movements
that are highly progressive and that gather considerable media attention.70 However, as
Auyero and Swistun note, local claims for justice do not necessarily have a unified agenda.71
Independent of their social status, the residents of Villahermosa were confused about how to
67 Bayat and Biekart, ’Cities of Extreme’, p. 823.
68 Michel Foucault, ‘Space, Knowledge and Power’, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (London:
Penguin Books, 1991), p. 245.
69 See Sletto, ’Insurgent Planning’; Zeiderman, ‘On Shaky Ground’, pp. 1575–76.
70 Nygren, ‘Eco-Imperialism and Environmental Justice’.
71 Auyero and Swistun, Flammable, pp. 4–8.
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contest the new modes of flood governance. This confusion was partly produced by the
hybridity of governance, where the multiplicity of actors and techniques diffused
responsibility. The authorities’ delayed tactics further strengthened such confusion. I was an
eye-witness in many situations, where residents’ demands for more just governance were
postponed by the policymakers and where government authorities claimed to those asking
more safety from the floods that the issues of environmental safety did not belong to their
responsibility. Such strategies easily exhausted the advocates struggling for increased justice
and equality in flood governance.
In such circumstances, people preferred conventional patron-client relations,
whose repertoires they somehow knew. Market-based mechanisms, where flood-risk
governance and environmental-service provisions were outsourced to private companies with
their own schemes of monitoring, made it difficult for people to know who was behind which
operation. In order to deal with the situation, the residents of Villahermosa invested heavily
in personal dealings with authorities, calculating that such ties would serve as important
avenues for negotiation. Such was the view of Claudio, a high-ranking official living in
Tabasco 2000:
Everyone arranges matters in the way he is able to: through friendships,
recommendations or under the table. Some politicians who live in Tabasco 2000 have
much influence. We…pressure the authorities through our personal networks.
(Claudio, 11 August 2011)
Correspondingly, although the poor contested the clientelist relations that favoured flood
protection in affluent neighbourhoods, they themselves also turned to such relations to
negotiate small favours to their own benefit. As Candelario, a political leader from Gaviotas
Sur, told me, ‘Sometimes you need to milk the authorities to get small benefits and tiny
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concessions.’72
Within the socially segregated city, there were considerable differences in
people’s willingness and ability to organise around environmental-safety issues. The affluent
and upper middle-class residents upheld the views of differentiated citizenship that granted
them privileges, and were thus reluctant to join movements claiming for environmental
justice. Correspondingly, informal residents were unwilling to mobilise via highly visible,
organised movements because of their position at the legal margin. More often, the Gaviotas
Sur residents’ touching stories were about how they recovered from the flood disaster and
from the everyday distress through informal tactics. Josefina, from Gaviotas Sur, told me the
following story of how she was able to move on despite everything:
During the flood, I thought that I have to be strong no matter what happens. I didn’t mind
losing things as long as nothing happened to my family…I work in a pie stand near Pino
Suarez. There are days that they sell and days they don’t…Here people are masons,
craftsmen, metalworkers, shoe-repairers, butchers, chicken-vendors, fruit-sellers,
seamstresses and tortilla-makers by profession…We’re poor but we have the right to do
what it takes to move forwards.
(Josefina, 12 August 2011)
Such stories provide illustrative examples of people’s impressive skills for mental recovery
and their strong sense of dignity. In her comment, Josefina explicitly emphasises that the
tortilla-makers and chicken-vendors are professionals (gente de profesión) and the poor have
the right (derecho) to move forwards. However, at the same time these accounts raise serious
concerns in my mind, especially because many informal residents told me how, after the
disaster, officials informed them that: ‘The flood came because of Nature…or because you
72 Author’s interview, 12 Aug. 2011.
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didn’t obey the rules. Thus, the government is not culpable, and so you need to just take care
of yourselves and recover’.73 Through such statements, the cause for flood was disconnected
from institutional procedures of governance and urban planning. Furthermore, although
noteworthy international and national disaster relief was provided for the victims right after
the disaster, people were subsequently urged to develop their own capacities to normalise
their lives.
Although the informal residents’ demands for improved living conditions
sometimes led to politicised demonstrations, contestation through invisible tactics was much
more common. Central to these contestations were claims that the flood risk cannot be
separated from the institutional deficiencies in flood governance. As a form of everyday
resistance, the residents of Gaviotas Sur refused to pay for electricity services. In contrast to
electricity companies’ accusations that the informal residents were shamelessly stealing
electricity, the residents of Gaviotas Sur perceived their illegal electricity networks – called
‘diablitos’ (‘small devils’) in the local dialect – as the only fair way to act in a situation where
the services provided for them were intermittent and the maximisation of energy production
in the operation of dams caused them flood hazards. As Tomas murmured, seeing people
wading waist-deep in water in October 2011, when Gaviotas Sur was once again inundated:
This flood is provoked by the government. It smells of dam-water. The authorities allow
floods here because they want to produce electricity for other parts of the country.
(Tomas, 16 October 2011)
These tactics brought to my mind Nancy Scheper-Hughes’ experience of carrying out
ethnographic research in Brazilian favelas where the residents repeatedly reminded her that
73 Author’s interviews, 12 Aug. 2011, 23 Aug. 2011 and 18 Oct. 2011.
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‘here, no one is innocent’.74 Although not allowed to express open criticism, the residents of
Gaviotas Sur were not unaware of the injustices involved in flood governance.
Alongside institutional strategies of governance, the social movements
operating in Villahermosa created mobile networks of contestation, based on a view that what
moves cannot be captured so easily. Schlosberg uses the Deleuzian metaphor of rhizomes to
explain such grassroots movements, which spread underground and connect in ways that are
invisible from above.75 In Mexico, social-justice advocates have learnt to work with mobile
networks and ephemeral tactics to confront the government’s intimidating measures to deal
with open protestors.76 This is especially true in Tabasco, where, due to the region’s crucial
role in the oil production, the government tends to dilute political mobilisation either by
persuasion or force. These fragmented networks of environmental and social-justice turn up
and disappear depending on conditions because, as Ronaldo, a social-justice advocate who
criticised the forced removal of informal residents explained to me, ‘such irregularity makes
it difficult for the authorities to know who exercises alternative agency and how’.77
Other factors that shape the formation of dispersed networks of everyday
resistance in Villahermosa include the long-standing structures of segregated urban policy
and planning. These structures feed localised community demands, rendering cross-city and
cross-class alliances for resistance movements purposeless. In the government’s relationship
with such mobile contestations, there is a ‘continuous attempt to govern those who evade
74 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, ‘Parts Unknown: Undercover Ethnography of the Organs-Trafficking Underworld’,
Ethnography, 5: 1 (2004), p. 45.
75 David Schlosberg, Environmental Justice and the New Pluralism: The Challenge of Difference for
Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 96, 120.
76 Nicolas Mathias Risdell, ‘Un crimen a la tierra de Morelos: Agravio, conflicto y justicia ambiental 2006–
2011’, unpubl. PhD diss, Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia, México D.F., 2012.
77 Author’s interview, 2 Aug. 2011.
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being governed through rhizomatic networks’.78 This situation indicates that these mobile
efforts to contest governance that incorporates people unevenly into neoliberal policies and
economies are strategic, even though this agency rarely manifests itself in the form of
organised movements.
Conclusion
Urban environmental governance is a rapidly evolving research field, with high relevance for
academic and public-policy understanding of governance, power and politics. The complex
relations between the state and the urban poor have been the subject of rich academic analysis.79
This study has amplified this field by analysing the positions forged by neoliberal flood
governance for socio-economically differentiated residents in the socially segregated but
dynamically interconnected city of Villahermosa, Mexico. The social-spatial distribution of
risks and vulnerabilities and the multiple intersections between elite, middle-class and low-
income residents have rarely been included in studies of urban governance.
This study has demonstrated how dominant discourses and political practices
constituted strict categories of governable spaces and governable subjects. This produced
socio-spatially differentiated strategies of flood governance within the city. Neoliberal
techniques of governance were strategically mixed with legacies of authoritarian control and
clientelist relations, producing complex mélanges. The state maintained a crucial, if
reconfigured, role in flood governance as strategic decision-making and financial resources
remained in governmental control. At the same time, the hybridity of governance blurred the
divisions between the state and the market, while promoting civic participation in strictly
78 Weszkalnys, ‘A Robust Square’, p. 258.
79 Auyero, ‘Ínvisible Fists’; Bogaert, ‘The Problem of Slums’; Nielsen, ‘Inverse Governmentality’.
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defined terms.
As Swungedouw notes, participation is one of the key arenas where struggles
over governance are now fought.80 Through strategic entwining of technological flood control
with programmes of civic involvement, flood governance was turned into an issue of cultural
adaptation and social resilience. The government’s aim in such social-learning mechanisms, in
my view, was to shepherd local residents towards neoliberal governance, where indirect
governmental oversight, market-based regulation and civic self-responsiblisation would
promote socio-spatial order. Environmental vulnerability was seen as rooted in the cultural
attitude of the informal residents, who, according to officials, needed to adopt new modes of
self-provision. This emphasis on self-improvement shifted the responsibility of flood-risk
governance from the government to the citizens, while the hybrid modes of regulation insulated
the acts of governing from public scrutiny.
This study has complemented post-Foucauldian views of governance by
combining the analysis of flood-governance strategies and practices with an ethnographic
inquiry on the everyday negotiations and contestations around governance and subjectivity. A
careful analysis of different city sectors enabled an exploration of how different groups of
residents interpreted and reconfigured the socially differentiated discourses and practices of
flood governance. It showed that local residents were not passive targets of institutional
interventions. Although the meanings they attributed to risks and vulnerabilities were strongly
shaped by prevailing flood discourses, diverse inverse tactics were evident in different
neighbourhoods. Dynamic intersections within the city both ruptured and sustained its socio-
spatial segregation.
Through focusing on social differences and the gap between what is attempted
and what is accomplished, this study has demonstrated how rationalities of flood governance
80 Swyngedouw, ‘Governance Innovation’, p. 1993.
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are constantly being modified.81 Through attention to the multi-vocal perspectives of socially
dispersed residents, the study revealed the diversity of tactics through which the residents
contested institutional endeavours to govern how they should think and act. At the same time,
it demonstrated the uneven access to resources and networks of influence, as well as the
fragmented nature of subversive strategies in a context where organised protests were
institutionally discouraged. Despite strong efforts to render certain actors and ways of life
governable, the dominant discourses and practices of governance were unable to eradicate
dispersed contestation efforts.
Given the unprecedented risks, uncertainties and vulnerabilities affecting
increasing population in Southern cities, a thorough understanding of the differentiated forms
of neoliberal governance and their dynamic contestations in diverse circumstances is crucial.
In urban theory, such analyses can provide important insights into the socially differentiated
nature of governance and contested struggles over subjectivity. At the same time, it can
contribute to wider discussions concerning the multifaceted relations between governance and
justice, material vulnerability and symbolic domination, and institutional responsibility and
inverse citizenship.
81 Tania M. Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development and the Practice of Politics (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 1–6.
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Figure captions
Figure 1. The study sites and the settlements located in the critical risk zones in Villahermosa
(modified from the Map Zonas de Alto Riesgo de Inundación, Gobierno del Estado
de Tabasco, 2010).
